Treatise... book 3

Book 3.1.1: “Moral Distinctions Not Deriv’d From Reason”

In this section Hume denies that virtue and vice are derived from reason (as is obvious by the title) by referring back to the last book, in which he proved that reason holds no control over our actions, only the passions. He adds to this by saying that reason seeks some absolute, a black-and-white answer, while morality can have “degrees” of rightness and wrongness.

Book 3.1.2: “Moral Distinctions Deriv’d From a Moral Sense”

Here Hume claims that morals are derived from impressions; makes the distinction between the “approbation” of virtue and the “disapprobation” of vice, and their accompaniment with the indirect passions of Pride/Humility and Love/Hate.

Book 3.2.1: “Justice, Whether a Natural or Artificial Virtue?”

This is where my views and Hume’s REALLY come together: justice is an artificial virtue, arising out of necessity by the social nature of mankind. If man were a solitary creature, there would be no need for justice; every man would fend for himself and the only justice would be retaliatory, and there would be no arbitrator between the two parties. But because of our social nature, we are forced to mediate the actions within our community, or we would otherwise be overtaken by a more organized community.

Book 3.2.2: “Of the Origin of Justice and Property”

My rant above suffices for the explanation of the origin of justice, and what follows is the origin of property. The concept of property is derived from the desire of “scarce” items. If the distribution of these items are not controlled by some separate medium (in the present day: money), it would be impossible to impose order upon the masses. This link between property and justice is inextricable.

Book 3.2.3: “Of The Rules, Which Determine Property”

In this section Hume explains how the different implications of ownership derive from present possession.

Book 3.2.4: “Of the Transference of Property by Consent”

Society depends upon a standardized set of rules in which property is transferred between owners. This can vary greatly between societies.

Book 3.2.5: “Of the Obligation of Promises”

Hume here shows that the convention of “promises” arise out of necessity, and that they could not be natural. Promises cannot be natural because to be so one would be required to prove that “…there is a peculiar act of the mind, annext to promises; and that consequent to this act of the mind, there arises an inclination to perform, distinct from a sense of duty.”

Book 3.2.6: “Some Farther Reflections Concerning Justice and Injustice”

This section reiterates and reinforces Hume’s argument for the artificiality of justice.