Moral Imagination

When I first saw the phrase "Moral Imagination" I immediately thought of "morality as externalization of internal values" (I have been reading too much Schopenhauer!), but now see that it refers to the psychology of value judgements.

The "moral hypocrisy" found by Batson et all was not surprising to me; everything we do is for our own benefit, even the supposedly selfless acts. From an evolutionary standpoint, the individual need only appear moral to reap the karmic benefits of a moral life. If he/she can operate under such a guise while secretly fulfilling every desire, then there is great potential for personal power. Authority figures seem to necessarily operate according to this (though possibly not as malignantly as I have described).

Though it wasn't mentioned in the Pardale article, how would "Archetype" work differently from stereotype and prototype? Intuitively, I would say it is something like prototype... I feel a Google search coming!

I am interested in the relationship between the technological deficit and constraint in education. Is it static or dynamic? I understand the deficit, but what is the nature of the constraint? Also, I find the "taboo" of formal emotional education strange, since we do it incessently, though informally.

Doubt11-12

There were many new themes that I noticed the second time through that I glazed over before, specifically the basketball analogy and the emphasis on Flynn’s fingernails. I’m still not quite sure what to think of them… but I know there is something important here. Another thing I noticed was the juxtaposition between Aloysius and James: both have great faith in their convictions, such that neither can come to terms that the other may be right. Since I already knew the plot and the events, I could concentrate more on the symbolism contained within each event, each word. Like Schopenhauer said, “all books should be read twice”, the first time to get the “general idea”, and the next to “find the truth contained within”.

Doubt 11-10

I found it extremely difficult to sympathize with any of the characters; Sister Aloysius and Mrs. Muller both seemed out of their minds, Sister James is too naïve, and based on the available evidence, I cannot make a accurate judgment on Father Flynn. He is very charismatic and likeable, yet these are two essential characteristics of a good liar!

I very much admire Sister James. I wish I could be so optimistic about people, I too often fall into a nihilistic pessimism!

With Aloysius and Flynn we have a very interesting difference in approach to leadership. Aloysius is a strict, detached disciplinarian, while Flynn is a compassionate mentor, but both wish (or seem to wish) for what is best for the child. Flynn’s apparent compassion may stem from something sinister, but it could just as likely be genuine. Aloysius seems very fake to me… as if her convictions are nothing but a front for deep-seeded doubt and uncertainty. I am always very suspicious of someone with such certainty, I would much rather admit ignorance than claim certain truth or falsehood.

Promise-Keeping

Maybe I’m reading the prompt wrong but isn’t the keeping of promises an obligation rather than a right? A right is something which insulates and protects an individual from the greater whole, while an obligation is a compromise of free-will within the community such that the societal structure may operate more efficiently, and as a byproduct, the individual will also benefit. The obligation of promise-keeping (including those promises which are subconscious) allows for not only larger and greater communities, but also the emergence of an economy. As technology advances and the division of labor becomes more pronounced, the obligation of promise-keeping becomes even more important.

It is therefore not our right to keep our promises but an obligation. However, it logically follows that the promisee has the right to seek retribution on a promiser who did not hold his/her end of the bargain. This retribution may not be physical but would mostly be social, in that the false promiser would gain a reputation for his dishonestly and be either exiled or subsumed back into the whole through conformity of societal norms.

I don’t think mankind ever made a “choice” to keep its promises, but it is rather inherent and requisite within our family dynamics, and is extended to the rest of the tribe who would be generally thought of as an extended family.

Mill 10/24

"Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof" (184)

I wholeheartedly agree with Mill! Questions of morality are impossible to answer with the typical reference to either science or logic, we must instead rely on anthropological and sociological observations and tendencies, which Mill alludes to:

"Whatever can be proved to be good, must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without proof." (184)

What Mill is saying is that we can only make moral conclusions based on a set of basic assumptions, which is how he goes about disproving earlier moralists. While this is fine in theory, you are making another assumption about your assumptions, namely that your assumptions are correct and everyone else is wrong.

Prep for Mill

If a particular action or an object produces pleasure while another produces pain, and the former is considered good and the latter bad, we should structure our lives such that we aim to maximize pleasure and minimize pain for the greatest amount of people in the community. Of course, too much of a good thing can cause pain, such as excessive eating, so excess must be necessarily avoided. The question is this: should the individual maintain a minimalist lifestyle so that he/she may donate to the greater pleasure of society? Or should the ascetic be shunned in favor of he who concentrates his most productive activities on himself and his closest friends? The answer is most obviously "somewhere in the middle", but that "somewhere" will be different for each individual, but those who fall at the ends of the continuum are significantly less helpful to the community that those closer to the middle.

Onora/Kant

Kantianism is differentiated from rights theory in that rights theory grants the same rights as adults, in the same form. Children obviously cannot make the informed decisions that an adult can (or at least should be able to), so the adults around them must (are obligated to) help them make these decisions. This obligation towards children is regarded as fundamental for O'Neill, and the rights of the child logically follow from this obligation, whereas the rights theorists claim that children have these rights in virtue of their humanity.

For me, Kantianism is appealling because it involves the fewest assumptions; the obligations logically follow from the recognized fact that children cannot survive without the support, guidance, and interaction with adults, whereas saying that humans automatically have certain rights is a pure assumption (however attractive it may be).

My main objection to O'Neill is- How may one determine when one is no longer obligated toward the children? Or, otherwise phrased, how may we know when a child has "grown up"? There are certainly people that try to make decisions for their (or someone else's) children when the child is more than capable of making that decision, for whatever reason.

Kant 10/15

My main question for Kant can actually be split into two; 1) why MUST we assume the existence of a god, and can we know his/her/its characteristics? And 2) if this assumption were tossed out, how would your system change?

If the God-assumption were abandoned, the conclusions he drew from the freedom principle would be quite different; his position on suicide would be nullified to some extent (some points could still be debated), and “defiling oneself by lust” would become a matter of pure opinion.

Also, how would the claim that the only true knowledge is a priori knowledge be justified? This is something I just can’t see…

Currently writing a paper...

I finished the reading for tonight but for the sake of my sanity I will not be posting my response until tomorrow night. I am finishing a paper for another class at the moment and expect it to take the rest of the night.

Kant 10/13

What immediately struck me most was Kant’s views on sexuality. He is of the opinion that marriage is not and cannot be strictly for procreation, because the marriage would be necessarily dissolved once procreation was no longer possible. Marriage is instead for “sexual enjoyment”, and offspring is just one possible end result. For his time, this was a pretty racy idea!

Something seems “off” about his idea of ownership, specifically the definition, but I can’t put my finger on it. However, I agree with most, if not all, of the conclusions he draws, though the specifics of “Private Right” seem long-winded and superfluous.

“Public Right” on the other hand was very interesting; I liked his idea that each branch of government must depend on another, even though it would not be difficult for such a state to fall into a gear-grinding bureaucracy. I am not sure whether or not he is serious about his concept of ruler, so I won’t comment on that until I learn more.

Kant 10/10

“moral laws… hold as laws only as they can be seen to have an a priori basis and to be necessary…” (pg 9)

This seems to make things very subjective. I will have to re-examine this when I have more time, unless someone could explain to me how this could produce sound arguments?

“Freedom, insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity.” (pg 30).

Yes!!!!! And this is the right from which all others are implicated! On this point I agree one-hundred percent with Kant, even though we draw different conclusions from this. Unfortunately, there are problems with this right, and exceptions to be made. At this point, I do not know how to account for these exceptions, so I will admit my ignorance for the time being.

“Natural perfection is the cultivation of any capacities whatever for ends set forth by reason. That this is a duty and so in itself an end, and that the cultivation of our capacities, even without regard for the advantage it affords us, is based on an unconditional (moral) imperative rather than a conditional (pragmatic) one…” (6:392a)

I would use the word “perfection” with caution. Perfection, like infinity, does not actually exist concretely, but rather abstractly; so while we may aim “towards” it, we cannot aim “at” it, and any attempts to do so will end in frustration and undue stress.

“Strength of any kind can be recognized only by the obstacles it can overcome…” (pg 156)

Hmm… I like this quote. It is officially going on my facebook!

Enquiry... sect 1-4

From what I have seen, Enquiry… truly is a condensed version of his Treatise…, the arguments and logic is nearly the same, yet not quite so long-winded. He still maintains that some virtues arise naturally while others artificially, that benevolence is generally regarded as the highest and most well-received of virtues, and that justice arises necessarily out of human interaction. I wish I could expand on this more but my knees are buckling under the weight of all the other work I am obliged to do!

Hume’s Enquiry… is valuable for contemporary readers because, well it’s timeless: it is not restricted by alien customs or political contexts; no knowledge of the context in which the book was written is needed to understand Hume’s arguments.

Sorry this post was so short, I feel like my responses are “watered-down”- normally I am very thorough in my assignments, but I have myself spread thin this semester.

Treatise... Book 3.3

“Actions themselves, not proceeding from any constant principle, have no influence on love or hatred, pride or humility; and consequently are never considered in morality.” (3.3.1.4)

I wonder if this is universally true; many will condemn an individual’s action yet claim “she is still a good person”.

“’Tis observed by critics… and is depriv’d of its natural influence upon society.” (3.3.1.22)

I suppose I just don’t understand the analogy given here… it doesn’t seem relevant (which is only my perception; I am sure there is a relevance).

“…pride, or self-applause, be sometimes disagreeable to others, ‘tis always agreeable to ourselves; as on the other hand, modesty, though it give pleasure to everyone, who observes it, produces often uneasiness in the person endowed with it.” (3.3.2.9)

Doesn’t this contradict Hume’s definition of virtue and vice? Isn’t virtue that which produces pleasure and vice that which produces uneasiness (in the self)? Or am I mistaken here?

Treatise... book 3

Book 3.1.1: “Moral Distinctions Not Deriv’d From Reason”

In this section Hume denies that virtue and vice are derived from reason (as is obvious by the title) by referring back to the last book, in which he proved that reason holds no control over our actions, only the passions. He adds to this by saying that reason seeks some absolute, a black-and-white answer, while morality can have “degrees” of rightness and wrongness.

Book 3.1.2: “Moral Distinctions Deriv’d From a Moral Sense”

Here Hume claims that morals are derived from impressions; makes the distinction between the “approbation” of virtue and the “disapprobation” of vice, and their accompaniment with the indirect passions of Pride/Humility and Love/Hate.

Book 3.2.1: “Justice, Whether a Natural or Artificial Virtue?”

This is where my views and Hume’s REALLY come together: justice is an artificial virtue, arising out of necessity by the social nature of mankind. If man were a solitary creature, there would be no need for justice; every man would fend for himself and the only justice would be retaliatory, and there would be no arbitrator between the two parties. But because of our social nature, we are forced to mediate the actions within our community, or we would otherwise be overtaken by a more organized community.

Book 3.2.2: “Of the Origin of Justice and Property”

My rant above suffices for the explanation of the origin of justice, and what follows is the origin of property. The concept of property is derived from the desire of “scarce” items. If the distribution of these items are not controlled by some separate medium (in the present day: money), it would be impossible to impose order upon the masses. This link between property and justice is inextricable.

Book 3.2.3: “Of The Rules, Which Determine Property”

In this section Hume explains how the different implications of ownership derive from present possession.

Book 3.2.4: “Of the Transference of Property by Consent”

Society depends upon a standardized set of rules in which property is transferred between owners. This can vary greatly between societies.

Book 3.2.5: “Of the Obligation of Promises”

Hume here shows that the convention of “promises” arise out of necessity, and that they could not be natural. Promises cannot be natural because to be so one would be required to prove that “…there is a peculiar act of the mind, annext to promises; and that consequent to this act of the mind, there arises an inclination to perform, distinct from a sense of duty.”

Book 3.2.6: “Some Farther Reflections Concerning Justice and Injustice”

This section reiterates and reinforces Hume’s argument for the artificiality of justice.

Treatise... book 2.3

I think what Hume meant by “Reason is… the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” is that just because reason may tell an obese person that he/she must lose weight, that person will not “automatically” lose weight or become motivated to do so. Nor does it have anything to do with “willpower”; when one of the two desires/passions (healthiness and appetite for one’s favorite foods) eclipses the other, the stronger desire/passion will always win out.

“But again, as facility converts pain into pleasure, so it often converts pleasure into pain, when it is too great, and renders the actions of the mind so faint and languid, that they are no longer able to interest and support it.” (2.3.5.4)

Normally Hume’s language is very clear to me, but this passage seems vague to me. I know it has something to do with custom, but its exact meaning escapes me.

“…tho’ distance both in space and time has a considerable effect on the imagination, and by that means on the will and passions, yet the consequence of a removal in space are much inferior to those of a removal in time. Twenty years are certainly but a small distance in time… yet I doubt if a thousand leagues, or the greatest distance of place this globe can admit of, will so remarkably weaken our ideas, and diminish our passions.” (2.3.7.4)

Very interesting! Distance has little effect on ideas (which is certainly true in our own age of information), but time can greatly distort or diminish them! A good example of this is the case of Nietzsche: his later works were extensively edited by his anti-Semitic sister, who later supported the Nazi party; for this reason alone Nietzsche’s works were shunned in the mid-20th century, yet today they are again praised as intellectual achievements. (Please correct me if I am wrong in any of this!)

Book II.1 and II.2

Book II.1

In this part Hume defines the passions Pride and Humility, and explains the causes, objects, and these particular passions’ relation to pain and pleasure.

Pride, according to Hume, is caused by one’s particular possession, whether it be a material possession (such as a beautiful house or great personal wealth) or immaterial (such as virtue or knowledge), whose idea produces pleasure and the correlative idea of self and ownership, which in turn is productive of Pride. The same is true of Humility: the lack of a thing or its deficiency in comparison to one’s peers causes pain and the idea of lacking that thing, itself causing Humility.

The objects of these passions are always the self- though one may say that he/she is proud of some relative or friend who has some great quality or achieved some great act or accomplishment, the object of the pride is not the relative/friend, rather it is one’s possession of the relationship to this great person which is the source of the pride.

The passions’ relation to pain and pleasure are unclear to me. Do the passions cause these feelings? Or do they exist prior to and separately from the passions?

Book II.2

Hume begins this section by explaining that Love and Hatred are much the same as Pride and Humility, differing only in their objects, which for the former pair is someone else, and the latter pair the self. Hume also explains that you must first know a person before you can say that you love or hate them: a person must be intimately known before any accurate value judgment may be placed on his character, all else is conjecture. He uses the example of Oliver Cromwell, who was hated by the Scots but revered by the English: how can a man be both hated and loved by so many who never met him?

Hume goes on to explain the “love of relations”, which is to say one’s love of someone else who share some commonality, such as blood, profession, or nation. Hume says this arises (I think) from the characteristic of which we are proud of in our selves that we see manifested in another.

According to Hume, we have a great tendency to hold the rich and powerful in high esteem, not because we have something to gain from them or that their possessions are themselves pleasing to us, but because of our sympathy towards them; their happiness produces in us the same effect.

Of the compound passions, there are eight, though we only focus on five. Benevolence and Anger, the first two discussed, are, as the editors put it, “the desire of adding to the happiness [or misery] of a person loved [or hated]” (I60). Compassion (or Pity) is the concern for another’s happiness, while Malice is the feeling of pleasure one feels when observing the plight of others. Envy is the result of the pain caused by the knowledge of a specific deficiency compared to someone else, such as one mediocre dancer envious of a greater one.

Hume and Human Nature

The three psychological tendencies are not hard to see, in fact they are painfully obvious. Being the social animals that we are, humans can not help but try to connect with those around them. We are influenced by each others emotions and compare our situations to others; we relate best to those whose situation is most similar to our own. That we tend to avoid pain is a given, though what is termed “pain” can be quite variable between individuals.

How did Hume come to his conclusions? I think he saw the human social tendency and the deviancies (I do not mean that negatively, only statistically) of behavior, along with the contrasting moral code of society, which is necessary to maintain social order, and examined the dynamics between morality and behavior, community and individual, etc., to determine the nature of these relationships.

I read a good chunk of the Treatise last year on my own, and am looking forward to re-reading it, I thoroughly enjoy Hume’s style and he has nudged me in the direction of positivism, though of a different sort than Hume’s or his later contemporaries, such as Carnap and Ayer… logical positivism created (almost) as many problems as it solved… Where the hell was I going with this? I don’t know, but I am pretty sure that it means that it’s time for bed; goodnight!

Zeno's Logical Paradoxes

What follows is a paper I wrote for my Ancient Philosophy class... in hindsight I think I could have done better, but such is the naure of hindsight! Criticism is warmly welcomed! Enjoy! :)

Zeno’s Logical Paradoxes

As someone immensely interested in logic and its applications, I was immediately gravitated towards the paradoxes of Zeno of Elea. I thought his conclusions were particularly interesting because of how contradictory they were to experience; by saying that “there is no motion”, “the faster will never catch the slower”, and that “the number of a thing is both finite and infinite, if not one”, he captures the attention of his audience and forces them to think and question how the universe operates.

The “Racecourse” argument against motion from fragment [10] is what captivated me the most; it seems to actually be two arguments, the first one being the equivalent of a disjunctive syllogism (the first premise could be rewritten: -AvB):

1. A->B (If there is motion, the moving object must traverse infinity in a finite time)
2. -B (The moving object cannot traverse infinity in a finite time)
:: -A (Hence motion does not exist)

and the second, an expanded version:

1. B->(A->C) (if every stretch is infinitely divisible, then for an object to
transverse some stretch, it must be able to pass an infinite number of
halfway points before reaching the end)
2. B (every stretch is infinitely divisible)
3. -C (The object is not able to pass an infinite number of halfway points)
4. B->(-A) (if every stretch is infinitely divisible, the object will not reach the end)
:: -A (the object will not reach the end, motion does not exist)

Both of these arguments are valid, however, premise 2 of the first argument and premise 3 of the second (and, by extension, premise 4) shall be negated below, leaving the argument unsound:

Suppose a sprinter is running a given length (the actual length itself does not matter) at 10 meters per second. If you cut that distance in half as Zeno would, the sprinter would still be moving at 20 half-meters per second, if cut that further by half the sprinter is moving at 40 quarter-meters per second, and further again will yield a speed of 80 eighth-meters per second. No matter how far you take this, the actual distance and time does not change, only the base unit of measurement. Even though the length of the track may be infinitely divisible, the course itself is not infinite in length.

All we have proven so far is that the sprinter can reach the end of the course, given that he/she is already moving, and that the course is not infinite in length. Zeno would argue that the sprinter could never be put into motion in the first place, which can be refuted by examining Newton’s first law of motion:

I- Every object in a state of uniform motion tends to remain in that state of motion unless an external force is applied to it.

“Every object in a state of uniform motion” includes objects at rest such as the sprinter in position on the starting blocks, who is at rest because the net forces acting on him are absolutely equal and opposite. Should the sprinter contract his muscles with sufficient force, he will have created a state of unequal net force, resulting in acceleration from the starting blocks and a state of motion.

The “Achilles” paradox seems strange to me in light of Zeno’s “Racecourse” paradox, in that they contradict each other. In the “Achilles” paradox Zeno asserts that “the pursuer, before he can catch the pursued, must reach the point from which the pursued started at that instant, and so the slower will always be some distance in advance of the swifter” (fragment [11], page 28), which must mean that Achilles can reach the point at which the turtle previously was. This contradicts Zeno’s argument from fragment [10], which concluded that motion does not exist. Motion cannot be both existent and no-existent, rendering at least one of these arguments false, as has already been shown of the “Racecourse”.

Suppose that Achilles is running a 100 meter course at a speed of 10 meters per second, and that the turtle starts from the middle at a speed of 1 meter per second (which is pretty fast for a turtle!). After 5 seconds, Achilles will have reached the spot from which the turtle, which is 5 meters ahead at this point, began. But before the 6th second is up, Achilles will have overtaken the turtle; there is no logical trickery here, only simple math. Is the distance between Achilles and the turtle infinitely divisible? Yes. Does this mean that the distance itself is infinite? As was shown in the “Racecourse” paradox, no.

The same criticism from physics can be applied to “The Arrow”. Zeno argues “Since a thing is at rest when it has not shifted in any degree out of place equal to its own dimensions, and since at any given instant… [the] thing is in the place it occupies at that given instant, the arrow is not moving at any time during its flight.” (fragment [12], page 29). This can be interpreted two ways: the first, that at any specific point in time, the arrow can only occupy a specific point in space, which cannot be anywhere else than where it is, and the second, that an object “is at rest when it has not shifted in any degree out of a place equal to its own dimensions”, which I take to mean that unless an object has moved in relation to itself, it has not moved at all.

The first is correct in saying that an object occupies only a single point at a given instant, yet the position of the arrow at a time already past or a time still to come may be calculated by adding the net forces acting upon the arrow in a specific vector and multiplying by the difference in time between the present and either the past or future instant; the resulting number represent the spatial coordinates that the arrow occupied or will occupy. Stated simply, if the arrow was not moving, the math behind the physics would not work and predictions could not be made.
The second interpretation would violate physics: for something to have moved in relation to itself, it would have to occupy more than one point in space. But movement is always measured in relation to something else, usually stationary and most commonly the earth.

This concept of movement in relation to something else brings us to Zeno’s fourth and final argument against motion, “The Stadium”. Zeno seems to be arguing that if two trains are traveling past one another in opposite directions, they are moving twice as fast in relation to each than to some other stationary train. If such is the case, Zeno argues, it only takes half the time to reach the end of the stationary train compared to the approaching train, since the distance traveled compared to the former is half of that of the latter with their respective points of reference. This is because the latter (the approaching train) is a moving point of reference. There is nothing mystical or paradoxical about this.

Finally we come to Zeno’s arguments against plurality (fragments [3] to [5]), which I would symbolize and work through, but it would be superfluous because one premise appears to be blatantly false, the premise being: “If there are many, the existents are infinite: for there are always other [existents] between existents, and again others between these”. This premise assumes that all things within the universe work in continuous number systems, and many do. For example there may be a specific star 432.562 light years away from earth, a block of cheese may weigh 3.2 pounds, and the average male may be 1.8 meters tall, but it would be fallacious to say that there exists within some village 208.5 people; even if a person were cut in half we would not say that he is less than one whole human. Numbers that operate in this fashion are said to be isolated, they are not separated from the next or previous number by 10 tenths of a number or 100 hundredths, rather, they separated by no less that one whole number. Thus Zeno’s argument is rather silly.

Zeno was very clever with his paradoxes, and while I would agree with him that many things are not as they seem, math does not lie or deceive. If the math from my arguments did not match up with my hypotheses I would simply concede with a shrug of my shoulders that I do not know the answer, and it may still be the case that I do not know as much as I thought I did, or that I interpreted something wrong along the way. Regardless, I think Zeno was a very important Pre-Socratic philosopher, and I value very much his way-outside-the-box thinking.

Catching up... Doris and Aristotle

I kind of feel bad writing this so late, it feels like I am “cheating” since I have already heard the answers to the questions in class… oh well!

As we discussed in class, a person’s action are largely dictated by situation and circumstance, rather than a personal system of morals. The implications of this sweep the carpet out from under Aristotle’s ethical theory; good people can do bad things. Because of the results of Milgram’s experiment and others like it, I would be inclined to agree with the saying “power corrupts”, due to the fact that the otherwise normal students turned violent once they had absolute power in their hands. It is for this reason I am particularly skeptical of “authority figures”, particularly politicians…

For Doris a virtuous person would be he (or she) who avoids situations where they would be coerced by the circumstances surrounding them to commit some unvirtuous act, whereas the vicious person makes no attempt to do so and may even seek these situations out.

Are the conclusions reached by Doris “close enough” to still fit within the Aristotelian framework? I think it could, but it seems to me that people will only follow their proclaimed system of ethics when they truly believe each virtuous action will benefit them either in the short or long term. So if you think donating to charity will make you feel better about yourself, either because you believe it will make a difference or because of the “bragging rights” associated with it (I know it sounds strange and shallow, but it happens and I see it all the time; it annoys the hell outta me!), then you will probably do so. However, I am not sure Doris’ conclusions necessarily fit… why?- well, that would require me to delve into perception and reality, and I simply don’t have enough caffeine for that! Perhaps this could be the topic of some future paper!

Getting behind...

Sorry everyone, I have spent all my available time the last couple days writing a paper for my Ancient Philosophy class, which I may post here later for comments/critique. I will also get today's post up sometime tonight.

Virtue

A) What distinguishes virtue from vices? Aristotle hammers the reader repeatedly with the answer to this: moderation. Too much fear is akin to cowardice, too little fear is the product of self-deception or mental dullness; Courage is facing fear at a particular moment, not denying it or running from it, but accepting it and functioning in the face of it. Aristotle goes on to explain the consequences of too much or too little of each "pleasure", such as friendship, will result in vice.

B) I'm not so sure I agree with Aristotle on this, I don't think moderation or virtuousness is essential for having a fulfilling life. I think balance is all that is needed, a balanced life that is harmonious with one's goals; balance is individualized and adheres to no template. Balance differs from moderation inasmuch as excess is only reached when a given pleasure disrupts the harmony and interferes with progression toward one's goals, the pleasure itself cannot cause imbalance. If one's goal in life is to run a successful business, one must take advantage of consumers by pricing one's products so that they bring in the most profit, regardless if this makes the product unaffordable for some or most. The same could be said of politicians: they must speak poetically to catch their constituents ears and whisper softly so that they may further their own agenda, even though their words may be empty. These things are decidedly non-virtuous, how may virtue and moderation help them with their aims?

Self-Actualization

According to Maslow, humans strive to achieve what he calls “self-actualization”- or as I would rather call it- “realization and execution of potential”. This can only occur once the lower levels of Maslows hierarchy of needs are secure, and few ever actually reach the top of this pyramid. Why? Some never reach this level for things out of their control, such as socioeconomic situation, but most are just too damn lazy! They are content to sit back and watch the world revolve around them. Everybody is good at something, and anybody can be good at anything; MEDIOCRITY IS A CHOICE!

Well, now that I have that little rant out of my system, on with the assignment… I don’t think there is one universal system that one can follow to achieve “actualization”. I have thought long and hard about this, yet the only thing actualized individuals have in common are the following traits: dedication, hard work, and adaptability. The first two are fairly obvious, but adaptability needs to be defined. Adaptability is not only the ability to react dynamically to any obstacle life can throw at you, but also the ability to change your lifestyle to one more conducive of progress in your given field. An example from my own life: as a competitive powerlifter, I have to make my body as efficient as possible at gaining strength. To do this I have made many changes to my lifestyle; I have cleaned up my diet, become more efficient with time management, forced myself to sleep more, and (almost) completely gave up alcohol. Since making these changes I have transformed from an “average” strength athlete to an “elite” one, I have seen consistent progress, and was recently invited to my first Pro-Am; none of this could have been accomplished without the dedication, hard work, and adaptation I have put in.

Socrates/Callicles

Position-
“CALLICLES: In my opinion, that’s what natural right is – for an individual who is better (that is, more clever) to rule over second-rate people and have more than them.” (p.75)

Evidence-
“CALLICLES: Under this wonderful regime of justice and self-discipline, how could they possibly be happy, when even if they did have political power they wouldn’t be able to use it to their friend’s advantage and their enemy’s disadvantage?” (p.79)

“CALLICLES: That if a person has the means to live a life of sensual, self-indulgent freedom, there’s no better or happier state of existence; all the rest of it – the pretty words, the unnatural, man-made conventions – they’re all just pointless trumpery.” (p.79)

Position-
“SOCRATES: Unhappiness, then, is the lot of someone who’s the opposite of self-disciplined – in other words, the kind of self-indulgent person you were championing.” (p.105)

Evidence-
“SOCRATES: Now, during Cronus’ reign human beings were subject to a law which the gods sanction even to this day and which is as follows: an human being who has lived a moral and god-fearing life shall on his death depart for the Isles of the Blessed and shal dwell there, and live a trouble-free life of happiness; anyone who has lived an immoral and godless life shall be imprisoned in the place of retribution and justice, which is called Tartarus.” (129)

“SOCRATES: …scourged and covered in the scars which ever dishonest and unjust action has imprinted on it, utterly crippled by lies and arrogance and warped by a truth-free diet—and he’d also see that the promiscuity, sensuality, brutality, and self-indulgence of his behaviour has thoroughly distorted the harmony and beauty of his soul.” (131)


If Plato had not been trying to express something important, the second half of this dialogue (with Socrates and Callicles) would have been very superfluous. What this something is I am not sure; my best guess is that he is trying to show that rhetoric for its own sake is immoral, that convincing someone of a course of action while having little knowledge of the subject yourself is a moral crime. I could find no textual evidence for this (which doesn’t necessarily mean there isn’t any), so I could be completely off base. Somebody help me out with this!

Gorgias

“GORGIAS: I’m talking about the ability to use the spoken word to persuade… to win over any and every form of public meeting of the citizen body. Armed with this ability, in fact, the doctor would be your slave, the trainer would be yours to command, and that businessman would turn to be making money not for himself, but for someone else- for you with your ability to speak and to persuade the masses.” (page 13)

Gorgias is saying that rhetoric is an essential tool for any politician, in that he may convince anyone to do as he pleases, given his rhetoric is up to par.

“SOCRATES: …rhetoric is an agent of the kind of persuasion which is designed to produce conviction, but not to educate people, about matters of right and wrong.” (17)

Here Socrates is saying that while the rhetorician may convince a crowd that a particular action is either morally right or wrong, he has not proved the action to be so; this implies that anyone with sufficient rhetorical skill can best a more knowledgeable opponent in a public debate, thereby nullifying the area of expertise.

“POLUS: …the license to do whatever you think it’s best for you to do in your community- the license to execute people and banish them, and to go to any lengths to see your personal predilections fulfilled.” (41)

It seems as if Polus is trying to entice Socrates toward the field of rhetoric, tempting him with power.

“SOCRATES: …someone might do what he thinks it’s best for him to do in his community, but fail to have a great deal of power and fail to do what he wants.” (39)

Socrates is suggesting to Polus that power is illusory, the powerful often have to bend to the powerless, thereby negating their power.

Developing a System of Social Morality

Morality is an artificial concept. I have come to this conclusion for many reasons- A) because of the vast differences between any two individual’s personal moralities, along with the hypocritical violation and self-exception of those moralities, how can one system claim to be superior to any other?, B) the fact that “moral” behavior appears to hold no advantage in the process of natural selection, C) the fact that all moral actions, even those of self-sacrifice, are inherently selfish, and finally, D) most moralities violate the Freedom Principle, as defined below.

Man stands above the rest of the animal kingdom because of his ability in complex reasoning and understanding of abstract concepts. This ability has led to something remarkable and unique, namely choices. I am not talking about basic choices such as choosing when to act upon instincts (hunger, waste disposal, etc), animals do these everyday in their struggle to survive. Rather than merely survive, humans can make world-altering decisions by weighing the consequences of each individual action with a measure of foresight. I believe this ability (namely, the freedom of choice) is our most basic right from which all other rights are deduced from and are subsidiary to.

I will extrapolate more on this issue when I get the chance (I left a LOT of stuff out), but as a simplified paraphrase of what I believe to be the most effective system of social ethics- one has the right to act in such a manner as pleases him/her, so long as said action does not interfere with another’s right of the same nature.